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Abstract
Governments in conflict torn states scramble for effective policies to persis-
tently reduce levels of violence. This paper provides evidence that a workfare
program that functions as a social insurance, providing employment opportuni-
ties in times of need, may be an effective antidote to shut down an important
mechanism that drives conflict. By mitigating adverse income shocks, the Indian
National Rural Employment Guarantee scheme has been successful in removing
the income dependence of insurgency violence and thus, contributes to persis-
tently lower levels of violence.
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1 Introduction
The World Development Report of 2011 sets out by pointing to the fact 1.5 billion
people are living in countries that are severely affected by internal and external
conflict. None of these countries has yet achieved even a single Millennium Devel-
opment Goal. This highlights a well-known fact: conflict is bad. A large literature
in economics has tried to assess the true social and economic cost of conflict and
the many channels through which it operates, such as by deterring human capital
investment (Leon (2009), Akresh and Walque (2008)), affecting time preferences
(Voors et al. (2012)), affecting capital investments (Singh (2013)), diverting for-
eign direct investment (Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008)) or increasing trade costs
(Besley et al. (2014)). While understanding the mechanisms through which conflict
is costly is important, policy makers are most interested in identifying ways and
means through which the dynamics and in particular, the persistence of conflict
can be affected. Another long-standing literature in economics and political sci-
ence has tried to understand whether economic shocks can cause conflict. Many
efforts have been made to collect empirical evidence documenting a quite robust
relationship between economic shocks and conflict (see e.g. Bazzi and Blattman
(2013), Dal Bo´ and Dal Bo´ (2011), Dube and Vargas (2013) , Fearon and Laitin
(2003) or Miguel et al. (2004)). However, there is surprisingly little work that
sheds light on whether public interventions can break the link between economic
shocks and conflict.
The key economic mechanism that has been identified is the opportunity cost
channel (see Becker (1968), Collier and Hoeffler (1998), and Chassang and Padro-i
Miquel (2009) among many). An economic shock puts downward pressure on
workers’ outside options, which renders joining or supporting insurgency move-
ments incentive compatible.1 Insurgents draw from this increased support base
and are able to affect more violence.
This argument implies that any intervention that smoothes away negative
shocks should contribute to weaken the link between economic shocks and con-
flict, through its stabilising effect on workers outside options. This paper is a
contribution to the nascent literature that tries to tackle the question on whether
public interventions can achieve this end.
A fundamental challenge is to find a testing ground, since conflict and a func-
tioning state that could provide for such an intervention rarely co-exist. India,
however, serves as a unique environment to study this question. Firstly, the coun-
1Alternatively, as Vanden Eynde (2011) argues, a low outside option induces insurgents to target
civilians as the government may try to hire civilians to become police informers.
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try has suffered from many low-intensity intra-state conflicts throughout its his-
tory. All these conflicts are endemic, but have all in all a relatively low intensity so
that the state still functions on many dimensions. Secondly, India introduced from
2006 onwards a social insurance scheme through the National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act (NREGA), that effectively serves as an insurance by providing em-
ployment opportunities in times of need. It is the biggest public employment
scheme in mankind’s history, currently reaching up to 47.9 million rural house-
holds annually, generating 210 million person-days of employment.2 Hence, it is
reasonable to assume that the program, due to its scale, may have an impact on
the dynamics of conflict.
I make three contributions. This is the first paper to study the relationship
between insurgency violence and social insurance in India. In particular, the focus
of this paper is not on the levels of violence, but rather on the elasticity of violence
with respect to income and how this relationship changes after the introduction
of the workfare program.
The second contribution lies in studying the dynamics of rural labour markets
in India and how these are affected by social security systems. In particular, I am
able to comment on the pass-through of productivity shocks on agricultural wages
and how this relationship is cushioned once a stable outside option offers itself to
workers. This effect contrasts with a persistent rainfall dependence of agricultural
production, highlighting that NREGA may be a substitute to the construction of
physical infrastructure. I thus focus on the insurance value of public employment
that serves as a income smoothing device and thus, may be a substitute to other
forms of insurance.
The third contribution is a methodological one. This is the first paper to use
a novel violence dataset that covers the whole of South Asia and has been con-
structed using scalable Natural Language Processing Tools (presented in Fetzer
(2013)). This paper highlights the possibility to use semi-automated machine-
learning routines for data cleaning and preparation in a field of economics re-
search, where data availability is always a severe constraint.
The key findings of this paper are as follows. Before the introduction of
NREGA, agricultural production, wages and violence in India were strongly rain-
fall dependent to the present day. This is a surprising finding, since the depen-
dence of Monsoon rainfall should have been weakened through decades worth of
investment in physical infrastructure such as damns, irrigation canals, or railroads
and roads. Nevertheless, the elasticity between Monsoon rainfall and agricultural
2See http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/mpr_ht/nregampr.aspx, accessed on 14.02.2013.
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GDP estimated in this paper is actually higher than the one presented in the ex-
isting literature derived from historical data. A one percent increase in Monsoon
rain, increases agricultural GDP per capita by 0.36%.3 This relationship between
rainfall and agricultural incomes appears to be the driving force behind the strong
reduced form relationship between Monsoon rain and conflict in India before the
introduction of NREGA.
Following the introduction of NREGA, I highlight in the second step that
NREGA appears to have completely removed the relationship between Monsoon
rain and conflict. A similar pattern emerges when studying agricultural wages.
The introduction of NREGA insulates agricultural wages from shocks, while agri-
cultural output is still very much dependent on Monsoon rainfall. This suggests
two things: first, NREGA serves as an effective tool to stabilise agricultural wages
and thus incomes; however, it is not able to affect the underlying agricultural
production function, at least in the time-period under study.
In the third step, I explore the underlying mechanisms that explain the reduced
form findings. I show that NREGA does function as a stabiliser with take-up -
both on the extensive, and the intensive margin strongly responding to contempo-
raneous and lagged rainfall. An 1% lower Monsoon rainfall realisation, increases
NREGA participation by 0.2%. These results hold up in an instrumental variables
design, suggesting that the elasticity between agricultural GDP and NREGA em-
ployment is around -1.6. The reduction in the rainfall dependence of conflict
appears to be partly driven by less violence against civilians. This supports recent
evidence documented by Vanden Eynde (2011), suggesting that the opportunity
cost channel drives violence against civilians who may be tempted to become
police informers.
However, my findings do not imply that India has become a more peaceful
place since the results only suggest that a particular driver of conflict has lost
its bite.4 Nevertheless, despite identification concerns, I provide some tentative
evidence that suggests that overall levels of violence, following the introduction
of NREGA, have gone down. This again, is driven by lower levels of violence
against civilians.
My paper contributes to still nascent but growing literature that evaluates the
extent to which public intervention can break the link between economic shocks
and violence. Moderating the relationship between conflict and productivity
3For comparison, estimates can be found in Jayachandran (2006) or Duflo and Pande (2007).
4Khanna and Zimmermann (2013) provide some evidence from a regression discontinuity design
that suggests that immediately after the introduction, there has been an increase in the levels of vio-
lence. Dasgupta (2014) on the other hand, document lower levels of violence.
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shocks requires insulating personal incomes from these shocks. Technologies that
can break the link between productivity shocks and incomes can be classified into
three categories: (1) physical infrastructure, (2) new production technologies or
(3) man made institutions. Most of the empirical literature has focused on evalu-
ating whether these technologies achieve their primary ends: moderating income
volatility.5 Only recently, some studies have emerged that take the results form
these papers to study whether they help break the link between productivity and
conflict. In the first category falls Sarsons (2011)’s paper, which builds on work
by Duflo and Pande (2007) suggesting that the construction of dams moderated
wage volatility, but appear not to have moderated Hindu-Muslim riots. Physical
infrastructure may prove to be effective only to a limited extent. Hornbeck and
Keskin (2011) finds that farmers adjust their production technologies to take ad-
vantage of irrigation, which leads to higher production levels but not necessarily
lower volatility. In the second category falls the work by Jia (2013), who studies
the moderating effect of the drought resistant sweet potato as a new technology
on the incidence of riots in historical China. This paper is the first to fall into the
third category, evaluating whether a politically created institution such as India’s
National Rural Employment Guarantee achieves the goal to insulate personal in-
comes from negative shocks and through that, remove the income dependence of
conflict.
My paper also relates to the wider literature on the economics of conflict.
Shapiro et al. (2011) study how levels of unemployment affect levels of insur-
gency violence in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Philippines, finding no support for
an opportunity cost channel at work. Iyengar et al. (2011) on the other hand, high-
light that increased construction spending seems to cause lower levels of labour
intensive violence. Blattman and Annan (2014) present results from a randomised
control trial in Liberia, indicating that interventions providing training and capi-
tal can greatly increase the opportunity cost of becoming a mercenary and thus,
contribute to weaken the relationship between shocks and conflict.6 A smaller lit-
erature studies conflict in India, in particular studying the Maoist movement and
the driving forces behind this conflict (see Gomes (2012)). Vanden Eynde (2011)
5Duflo and Pande (2007) evaluate the construction of dams and its impact on agricultural production
in India. Aggarwal (2014) studies the impact of road construction, while Donaldson (2010) study the
impact of railroad construction in colonial India. Burgess and Donaldson (2009) build on that work to
study how trade integration may have cushioned the effect of adverse productivity shocks on famine
mortality. Another vast literature tries to understand and design effective rainfall or weather insurance
schemes (see e.g. Lilleor and Gine´ (2005) or Cole et al. (2008))
6This contrasts with Blattman et al. (2014), who find that a Ugandan employment program, despite
large income gains, is correlated with lower levels of aggression or protests.
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and Kapur et al. (2012) established that the Naxalite conflict varies systematically
with incomes or proxies thereof, suggesting an opportunity cost channel at work.
This paper will build on to their work, studying conflict across the whole of India7
and how the NREGA workfare scheme, by stabilising outside options, removed
the opportunity cost channel.
There is also a growing literature that evaluates the NREGA workfare pro-
gram. Several papers have found that NREGA lead to increases in agricultural
wages (Zimmermann (2012), Berg et al. (2012), Imbert and Papp (2012) and Azam
(2011)). I will show that the stabilisation in agricultural wages takes place in
case of a negative rainfall shock - which corresponds to times when demand for
NREGA employment is found to be particularly high. As with any other public
works programme, NREGA has been criticised by many stakeholders for its inher-
ent inefficiency and susceptibility to corruption. Indeed, Niehaus and Sukhtankar
(2013a) and Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2013b) find evidence of widespread cor-
ruption in the system. There are a few papers that have studied NREGA take-up
behaviour. Johnson (2009) finds that take-up is highly seasonal and concentrated
in the off-season. I confirm his findings, but find evidence that this take-up is
driven by rainfall shocks in the preceding growing season, suggesting that agents
do use NREGA to smooth consumption when being faced by an adverse shock.
This highlights the potential consumption smoothing benefits from public em-
ployment (Gruber (1997)). I contribute to the growing literature on NREGA by
combining these three observations and linking them to the nature and path of
insurgency violence in India.
The paper is organised as follows. The second section provides some back-
ground on the context, the workfare program as well, the related literature and
a conceptual framework. Section 3 discusses the data used. Section 4 presents
the core empirical design and studies the relationship before NREGA was intro-
duced. Section 5 studies NREGA take-up, while section 6 explores the situation
after NREGA had been introduced. The last section concludes.
2 Context: Conflict and Insurance in India
Insurgencies in India India serves as a unique testing ground as there are
many small-scale insurgencies that have affected India’s economic development.8
7For all the analysis, I exclude Kashmir as this conflict is distinctly more violent and has significant
inter state dimensions.
8See for example Singh (2013) for estimates of the effect of the Punjab insurgency on local invest-
ment. Nilakantan and Singhal (2012) provides some estimates of the economic cost of the Naxalite
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The three main conflicts are in the North East of India, mainly comprising the so-
called Seven Sister States, the Naxalite Insurgency that stretches through the Red
Corridor across the East of India, and thirdly, the conflict in Kashmir. The conflicts
can be grouped roughly into movements for political rights (e.g. Assam, Kashmir,
Tamil’s and Punjab), for social justice (the Naxalite conflict and the conflicts in the
North East) and conflict on religious grounds (such in Ladakh [Kashmir] or the
various religious conflicts between Muslim, Hindu and Christian groups all over
India).
The intensity of these conflicts varies significantly over time. The Kashmir
conflict has reduced in intensity significantly, while conflicts in the centre and the
North East continue unabatedly. The conflict between the Assamese separatists
and the Indian state has been on-going for more than forty years and has lead
to a death-toll in excess of 30,000.9 Concerning Naxalism, there exist no widely
acknowledged data on the number of casualties, but the conflict has intensified
in recent years with 2010 being considered as one of the bloodiest years ever.10
It is difficult to study each conflict in isolation, as especially the conflicts in the
East and North-East of India are indeed related. The Indian Home Minister e.g.
suggests that the northeastern state of Assam has been emerging “as the new
theatre of Maoist groups”, with collaboration between United Liberation Front of
Assam rebel groups and the Naxalites. Hence, studying a conflict in isolation may
be insightful, but fails to capture possible broader underlying relationships.
NREGA workfare program The NREG scheme is a country-wide workfare
program, which was passed as an act in 2005 and was introduced out from early
2006 onwards.11 The program was rolled out sequentially in three phases: 200
districts received NREGA from early 2006 onwards, another 130 followed in 2007
and the remaining districts received the scheme in 2008. The exact algorithm
used to determine which districts would receive the program first and which
ones receive it later is not known. However, it is clear that the roll-out was highly
correlated with pre-existing poverty levels and correlates well with an index of
backwardness constructed in Planning Commission (2003). This index ranks dis-
tricts by their backwardness based on the share of scheduled caste / scheduled
conflict in the state of Andhra Pradesh.
9See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/assam.htm, accessed on 14.02.2013.
10See http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hjfxXhNgGjp9JIyCj2ubaSKI6wIA?
docId=CNG.134eae01c393f94f33516bafd808dfc9.371, accessed on 02.04.2013.
11I will use the term NREG Act, NREGA and NREGS interchangeably. Though it is clear that the act
is distinct from the scheme introduced under the act. The latter is the subject of this analysis.
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tribe population, the levels of agricultural wages and levels of agricultural output
per worker. Furthermore, Khanna and Zimmermann (2013) also suggests that the
introduction was endogenous to pre-existing levels of insurgency, in particular,
Maoist violence. This makes identification of a level effect particularly challeng-
ing, though, as will be highlighted in the empirical design, my identification strat-
egy does not rely on the exogeneity of treatment assignment with respect to levels
of violence.
The scheme under the NREGA Act is the largest known workfare program,
generating 2.76 billion person-days of employment during the financial year 2010/
2011. It stipulates that Indians in rural areas are entitled to work 100 days per year
on public projects. The program is demand-led, so that the Gram Panchayat has
to provide NREGA work if inhabitants require such employment. This implies
that - if participating in the program is only attractive, when facing depressed
outside options - we would not expect the program to have a sudden impact
on violence, but only through the insurance channel. Thus, only when facing a
negative income shock, should there be an effect of the program on violence by
increasing the opportunity cost of joining or supporting rebel forces.
The implementation of the program is very decentralised. The Gram Pan-
chayat sets up a list of projects. These typically can range anywhere between
road construction, well digging, forestry or other forms of micro-irrigation. These
projects could thus provide two benefits: first, it could offer the workers a direct
benefit through the wage payments and secondly, it could have longer lasting
impacts on agricultural productivity.
The NREGA act further requires that 60 percent of the budget for a project be
allocated to wages. Also, the use of machines or contractors is prohibited. Work-
ers have to apply for work in NREGA projects by filling out a written application
form, after receipt of the application, the Gram Panchayat has to provide work
within two weeks after receipt of the application. If the panchayat fails to provide
work, a daily unemployment allowance (which is below minimum wage) is to
be paid. The projects on which workers are employed have to be in close prox-
imity to the home of the worker (at most 5 km distance) and there is additional
renumeration for transportation costs or living expenses, while on the work site.
The wages are to be paid by piece rate (depending on the nature of the project)
or through daily wage rate. These have to be above the state-level minimum wage.
The NREGA wages must be paid by cheque or by transfer to post-office or bank
accounts. In the financial year 2010-2011, expenditure on NREGA reached $ 7.88
billion, thus representing 0.5 per cent of Indian GDP.
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3 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses
It is helpful to develop a very simple conceptual framework to guide the empirical
analysis. The opportunity cost argument can be formalised as in Iyengar et al.
(2011). Suppose that an individual i maximises a simple utility function u(C)
subject to a budget constraint C = y. He or she can earn income y from working
as agricultural labourer L or by joining the insurgent activity V. The agricultural
wage is a function, e.g. of the underlying soil productivity characteristics, but
especially the degree of rainfall R, that is wL(R). This sets up the possibility for
there to be an effect of rainfall shocks on incomes, which is a hypothesis to be
tested.
Hypothesis 1 Agricultural wages and output are increasing in the level of Monsoon
rainfall.
The net return of an individual i supporting an insurgency is wV − θi, where
the pecuniary income wV is fixed, but θi is a measure of the degree to which an
individual supports the objectives of the insurgency group or the degree to which
the individual may dislike violence.12 The θ’s are drawn from a distribution with
a cumulative distribution function H(θ). The key decision that a worker takes
is whether, or not to participate in an insurgency. The marginal insurgency sup-
porter defines a θ threshold level as θ¯ = wV −wL(R) such that all individuals with
θ < θ¯ would support the insurgency. Hence the mass of individuals partaking in
the insurgency is given as H(θ¯). Clearly, ∂H(θ¯)∂R = −h′(θ¯)w′(R) < 0, i.e. a nega-
tive rainfall shock will increase the share of the population that participates in the
insurgency. Provided the function that generates violence F(H(θ¯)) is increasing
in the insurgency movements strength, a low rainfall realisation will induce more
violence.
Hypothesis 2 Insurgency violence is decreasing in the level of Monsoon rainfall.
In this setup, the insurgency movement is effectively providing insurance as it
provides stable wages irrespective of the realisation of rainfall as has been noted
before. With the introduction of a workfare program, this role is taken over by the
public employment offered by the government and thus, can serve as a means to
stabilise the outside option of workers. For simplicity, suppose there are two realisa-
tions of R ∈ {Rl , Rh} which occur with a probability p and 1− p respectively.
12Clearly, wV may be a function of rainfall as well; however, the assumption here is that insurgencies
are able to pool risks somewhat and thus are able to offer relatively more stable wages.
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The average θ¯ across districts is given as E1(θ¯) = wV − E(wL). This measure
will change with the introduction of the workfare program. Conceptually, we can
think of the workfare program as creating a third sector P for public employment,
which pays a fixed minimum wage wP. Assume that wP > wL(Rl) but wP <=
wL(Rh). There are now two threshold levels for θ, which depend on the state h, l
which was drawn.
θ¯ =
wV − wL(Rh) if hwV − wP if l
It is reasonable to assume that for average rainfalls wP < wL(R¯), but it may
well be that for R sufficiently low, the public sector wage is above the wage that
would be offered by the agricultural sector. The average θ across districts is given
as:
E2(θ¯) = wV + pwL(Rh) + (1− p)wP
clearly, E1 > E2 provided wP > wL(Rl). The latter is true by revealed prefer-
ence, if take-up on the extensive margin is responsive to rainfall realisations.
Hypothesis 3 Provided that the wage paid under NREGA is higher than that paid in the
agricultural sector due to a bad Monsoon, NREGA participation is negatively correlated
with higher levels of Monsoon rainfall.
From this, it is evident that due to E1 > E2 after the introduction of the work-
fare program, there are fewer individuals participating in the insurgency as av-
erage incomes are stabilised at a higher level. Since expected incomes are not a
function of Rl anymore, this gives rise to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 Following the introduction of NREGA, conflict becomes less responsive to
Monsoon rainfall.
In the empirical analysis, I will address each of these hypotheses in turn. With
this roadmap in mind, I now turn to discuss the data used in this paper before
presenting the empirical specifications and the results.
4 Data
District Level Conflict data The conflict data used in this paper is drawn
from the South Asian Terrorism Panel, which has collected newspaper clippings
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related to conflict across South Asia since the late 1990s. The dataset is extremely
rich and complex, covering around 28,000 newspaper clippings for India alone. It
is not feasible to hand-code this data without any prior structuring. The lack of
structured data has been a key problem plaguing the conflict literature. In Fetzer
(2013) I propose a method to use sophisticated natural language processing tools
to be applied to the raw newspaper clippings to retrieve core pieces of informa-
tion that can be transformed into a workable conflict dataset. The idea is simple:
the Natural Language Processing routines try to follow the same procedure that
humans would use to classify newspaper clippings into incidence counts, by iden-
tifying the subject, verb and object which constitute a violent act. Based on a set
of verbs that are considered to be indicative of a violent act (this can be a very
exhaustive list), machine learning routines then analyse sentences in which such
keywords appear, identifying the subject, object, locational and time information
in the neighbourhood of that verb. Appendix A.1 provides an example of how the
algorithm constructs an incident count based on individual newspaper clipping,
while Appendix A.2 compares the dataset to the Global Terrorism Database. The
insight is that the semi-automatically retrieved dataset performs extremely well,
compared with other violence datasets and even with manually coded data drawn
from the same newspaper clippings.
For this study, the main dependent variable is the number of terrorist inci-
dences per district and quarter. This includes all incidences with at least one
fatality, but also accounts for general attacks on infrastructure, such as the de-
struction of telecommunication masts, or attacks without fatalities. These are
informative of the insurgents fighting capacity, but are typically not included in
other conflict datasets.
The left panel of Figure 1 shows the total number of incidences on a loga-
rithmic scale between 2001 and 2006 across India. It clearly highlights the three
major conflict areas: first, the Naxalite conflict, which stretches across India, in
the so-called ”red corridor”.13 The second source of major conflicts occur in the
north-east, in the so-called ”7 Sister States”. There, various insurgency outfits seek
to obtain independence from the Indian Union. The third major conflict is in the
Kashmir region in the north west.
The right panel in Figure 1 plots the intensity of violence after 2006. It becomes
clear that violence seems to have become more prevalent across India, in particular
in the ”red corridor”. While conflict remained at high levels in the Seven Sister
13The states affected include Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Orissa, Bihar, Jharkhand,
Chattischargh and West Bengal.
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Figure 1: Spatial Dimension of Terrorist Attacks before 2006 (left) and after 2006 (right)
States, there appears to be no geographic between the conflicts there and the red
corridor, which coincides well with the anecdotal accounts suggesting that various
groups in the northeast work together with the Maoists. The intensification of
violence, in particular in the Naxalite conflict and in the North East has also been
noted in anecdotal accounts, with 2010 being considered one of the bloodiest
years ever.14 For the main exercises of the paper, I will study India as a whole,
but leave out Kashmir, as this conflict has very strong inter-state dimensions (see
e.g. Mohan (1992)). The map suggested that violence levels were increasing over
time, in particular in the East and North East of India. This is confirmed in Figure
2, which plots the time-series of recorded incidents in the area of study.
Aside from the novel violence dataset, I also invoke a new high resolution ob-
servational weather data obtained through remote sensing techniques techniques
from a novel precipitation radar, this is described in the next section.
Rainfall data This paper uses data from the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mis-
sion (TRMM) satellite, which is jointly operated by the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) and the Japan Aerospace and Exploration Agency
(JAXA). The satellite carries a set of five instruments to construct gridded rainfall
14See http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hjfxXhNgGjp9JIyCj2ubaSKI6wIA?
docId=CNG.134eae01c393f94f33516bafd808dfc9.371, accessed on 02.04.2013.
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Figure 2: Number of Terrorist Incidents over Time
rates at very high spatial and temporal resolution. Due to the high spatial and
temporal resolution it is providing more consistent rainfall estimates than any
other available ground based observations and is considered the highest quality
rainfall dataset with global coverage that is currently available (Li et al. (2012)).
Its adequacy to pick up the spatial heterogeneity in precipitation has been high-
lighted and verified in the Indian context by Rahman and Sengupta (2007), who
have shown that it outperforms e.g. the Global Precipitation Climatology Centre
(GPCC) rain gauge analysis data that has been used extensively in economics re-
search.15 Please consult Appendix A.3 for a more detailed discussion of the data.
The daily rainfall from 1998 to 2012 comes at a fine spatial resolution of 0.25 by
0.25 degree grid-cell size, which is converted into overall monthly monthly rainfall
in mm.
For the identification, I will focus on the Monsoon season rainfall, which I
define in two ways based on the principal crops grown using the state specific
Indian crop calendar.16 I use a narrow- and a broad definition of the Monsoon
period. This varies from state to state as the typical onset dates are early May
for the north east of India, while the onset may be as late as late June for central
India. For most states, the narrow Monsoon-period ranges from June to Septem-
15For example by Miguel et al. (2004), Ferrara and Harari (2012) and Kudamatsu et al. (2012). As this
data product comes at a coarse spatial resolution, researchers typically apply inverse distance weight-
ing methods to interpolate between grid-points. This typically underestimates the spatial variability or
induce variability where there is actually none (see Haberlandt (2007)). This will affect the estimation
of extreme values that these papers typically rely on for identification (Skaugen and Andersen (2010)).
16In particular the key reference is the crop specific calendar maintained by the Indian Food Se-
curity Mission, available via http://nfsm.gov.in/nfsmmis/RPT/CalenderReport.aspx, accessed on
12.05.2013.
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ber, while the broad ranges from May to November. The narrow Monsoon period
accounts for 80% of the annual rainfall, while the broad Monsoon period covers
roughly 90% of annual precipitation. For the main analysis I will use the narrower
definition that focuses on the key principal crops and use the log of that rainfall.
The broader measure and various other transformations are used for robustness
checks.
NREGA Participation Data I use the NREGA participation data derived from
the so-called Monthly Progress Reports (MPR) from before 2011 and from the
Management Information System (MIS) from 2011 onwards. The key variables
I study are extensive margin participation as the share of households in a dis-
trict that participate under NREGA in a given financial year, the days worked
per household and the total person days generated. I also obtained data on the
number and total cost of ongoing projects, where I classify projects for irrigation
purpose specifically.17
I study three major margins of NREGA take-up. Firstly, extensive margin
participation as the share of households in a district who demand employment.
Secondly, intensive margin participation as the log of the number of days worked
per household. Last but not least I consider a measure of the number and cost of
ongoing NREGA projects.
Agricultural Production and Wages In order to test whether NREGA had
an impact on the cyclicality of agricultural wages and agricultural production, I
construct time-series for the two. To construct agricultural wages, I use Agricul-
tural Wage Data from the Agricultural Wages in India (AWI) series which has
been published by the Indian Ministry of Agriculture since 1951. It is unique in
offering monthly wage rates by district (sometimes even containing multiple lo-
cations per district), and separate wage series for several categories of labour and
by gender. The quality of the data is very poor however, with a large number of
observations being missing or simply flat wages being reported throughout. In
order to increase the signal to noise ratio, I average the data to generate an annual
wage series. I detail some of the issues with this dataset in appendix A.6. More
reliably measured is agricultural production. I use data on annual district level
production collected and published by the Directorate of Economics and Statis-
tics with the Ministry of Agriculture.18 For every district, I only consider crops
17Refer to Appendix A.7 for further discussion of the available NREGA participation data.
18This data is available on http://apy.dacnet.nic.in/cps.aspx, accessed 14.08.2013.
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that have been consistently planted on at least 1000 hectares for the period that
the state reports data. I use state-level harvest prices to construct a district level
measure of agricultural GDP.
I the next section, I present the empirical strategy before presenting the core
results.
5 Empirical Strategy
The aim of the empirical design is to cleanly estimate the changing functional
relationships between Monsoon rainfall and agricultural output, wages, the inci-
dence and intensity of violence. To this end, I separately estimate the relationships
before the introduction of NREGA and once, for the whole sample after the intro-
duction of NREGA.
The main specification that uses agricultural GDP per capita or wages as left-
hand side is:
log(ydt) = ad + bpct + θRdt + X′pdtß + ecpdt (1)
where Rdt measures contemporaneous Monsoon season rainfall, ad is a district
fixed effect, absorbing any time-invariant district characteristics such as terrain
ruggedness or elevation. I construct region and NREGA phase specific time fixed
effects in bpct.19 These demanding time-fixed effects address a key concern as
they flexibly control for the fact that the NREGA introduction happened in three
distinct phases. Districts in the first phase were poorest and may be subject to
distinct shocks or were on distinct (non-linear) trends. These fixed-effects take
into account such variation. The matrix Xpdt contains a set of district controls
that are included in some specifications. These include a set of time-invariant
characteristics that have been identified to correlate with the sequence of roll out
of NREGA and will be used for robustness interacted with a set of time-fixed
effects. These characteristics are identified by exploiting cross-sectional variation
across districts estimating:
Phased = a + H′dβ+ ud (2)
where Phased is an integer that is either 1, 2 or 3 indicating in which phase a
19The geographic regions I consider are the states in the Red Corridor (Andhra Pradesh, Orissa,
Bihar, West Bengal, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka and Maharashtra). The states in the Northeast
(Assam, Meghalaya, Sikkim, Tripura, Mizoram, Nagaland and Manipur). The remaining states, mainly
in the west of India are contained in its own group.
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district received the program and Hd is a matrix for the candidate district charac-
teristics.
For agricultural wages, I include a set of state by NREGA phase specific linear
time trends. These become necessary as agricultural wages are increasing dramat-
ically but distinctly for some states in a way that is not captured by the time fixed
effects.
The main specification I estimate for conflict is a conditional fixed effect Pois-
son model as in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). This accounts for the count
nature of the conflict data. The specification is:
E(Apcdt) = δd exp (bpct + ηRdpt−1 + X′pdtß + ecpdt) (3)
The results are robust to using plain OLS or negative binomial estimators, and I
also present results on the incidence of conflict which is simply a linear probabil-
ity model.20 Note that rainfall is measured from the preceding calendar year or
growing season, which is in line with the existing literature and I confirm that the
effect of Monsoon rain on conflict mainly happens with a one year lag.
Following the introduction of NREGA, I essentially estimate the same specifi-
cations except that I add an interaction term between the rainfall variable Rdt or
Rdt−1 and an NREGA treatment indicator. That is, I construct a dummy variable:
Tdpt =
1 if NREGA available in district d at time t,0 else.
Note that by including region by phase- and time fixed effects, the treatment
indicator is perfectly collinear with these fixed effect. The variation used to iden-
tify the effect comes from within phase-regions over time and thus, I do not live
off of variation across districts in different NREGA implementation phases. This
is important to bear in mind, as the roll of out NREGA was likely endogenous to
pre-existing levels of violence, as has been argued in Zimmermann (2012), which
makes it very difficult to exploit variation across NREGA phases.
20See table ?? in the appendix for these checks. I use a Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Poisson (PPML)
estimator as implemented by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) as it overcomes some of the numerical
problems in common implementations in statistical packages such as Stata (see Silva (2011)). The PPML
estimator does not require the data to have equi-dispersion. It is consistent, so long as the conditional
mean is correctly specified. The estimator is even optimal if the conditional variance is proportional
to the mean, hence over dispersion is not an issue. Note further that conditional and unconditional
likelihood yield identical estimates, but typically the former is chosen as the computation is quicker
(Cameron and Trivedi (1999)).
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The estimating equation then becomes:
log(ydt) = ad + bpct + θRdt + γTdt × Rdt + X′pdtß + ecpdt (4)
while the Conflict regressions are
E(Apcdt) = δd exp (bpct + ηRdpt−1 + γTdt × Rdpt−1 + X′pdtß + ecpdt) (5)
The identifying assumption for these models is that the timing of the intro-
duction of NREGA in a district was not endogenous to the previously existing
relationship between rainfall and conflict. This explicitly allows for the fact that
the roll-out likely was endogenous to the levels of violence. In order to control
flexibly for the previously existing relationship between Monsoon rain and out-
put, I construct a district specific elasticity θd by running
log(ydt) = ad + θdRdt + νdt (6)
for every district using data from before the introduction of NREGA, where ydt
measures agricultural output. I use the estimated elasticities θˆd’s as an additional
control in Xpdt interacted with a set of time-fixed effects in some specifications.
In order to study the underlying mechanisms, I explore NREGA participation
data on the intensive and the extensive margin by estimating:
Ppcdt = δdk + bpct + ηRdt−1 + X
′
pdtß + epcdt (7)
where Ppcdt is a measure of intensive- or extensive margin NREGA participa-
tion. As the underlying data sources change in a way that systematically varies
across districts from 2011 onwards, I include district fixed effects dk that are dif-
ferent depending on the underlying datasource indexed by k.21 I also entertain an
instrumental variables specification, instrumenting for lagged agricultural output
using lagged Monsoon rain.
For Poisson models I present standard errors clustered at the district level. For
the linear models, I present standard errors that account for spatial dependence as
discussed in Conley (1999).22 The implicit assumption here is that spatial depen-
dence is linearly decreasing in the distance from district centroids up to a cutoff
distance, for which I chose 500 km. Note that some datasets are an unbalanced
21Refer to appendix A.7 for more details. The results are robust to using just either part of the data.
22 I use a routine that iteratively demeans the data before computing the standard errors as in Hsiang
(2010). The Stata code for this function is available from my personal website on goo.gl/ACbuLA.
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panel, in which case the spatial HAC procedure is problematic. For these cases,
I present the more conservative standard errors either obtained by clustering at
district level or from the Conley routine.23 I now proceed to present the main
results.
6 Results
6.1 Before NREGA: Agriculture, Wages and Violence
This section studies the period before the introduction of NREGA. I restrict the
analysis to this period to highlight that the relationship between Monsoon season
rainfall, agricultural output, wages and violence had existed well before the in-
troduction of the workfare program. The results from specifications 3 and 4 are
presented in Table 1. Columns (1) - (2) study agricultural GDP per capita. Column
(2) suggests that a one percent increase in Monsoon season rainfall increases agri-
cultural GDP in that year by 0.36%. The comparison with column (1) which uses
the whole annual rainfall highlights that the bulk of the effect of annual rainfall
is coming from the Monsoon season.24 This is a surprising finding, since decades
worth of investment in irrigation facilities should have rendered the agricultural
output more resilient. In fact, the estimated coefficient here is higher than that
found in other previous studies (see for example Jayachandran (2006)), suggest-
ing that this study improves upon the existing work by reducing measurement
errors.
Column (3) - (4) performs the same exercise for agricultural wages. The pass
through of rainfall variation is statistically significant, but small in size. A 1%
increase in rainfall increases agricultural wages by 0.06%. Again the effect is
driven almost in its entirety by Monsoon season rainfall.
The last four columns focus on conflict. The estimated coefficients in columns
(5)-(6) are elasticities, suggesting that a 1% increase in Monsoon rainfall reduces
conflict by 0.87%. The incidence of conflict is also statistically very responsive to
Monsoon rainfall variation. Note that the results compare very well with Vanden
23All results hold up when clustering at the district level, clustering at the state level is not feasible
as there are fewer than 30 clusters in most specifications. An alternative is to cluster at the state by
NREGA implementation phase level, most results are robust to clustering at this level. These results
are available from the author upon request.
24Appendix Table A1 provide some robustness checks adding further temperature controls and other
district characteristics and focusing on grain production. Appendix Figure A2 highlights the smooth
and monotonous relationship between agricultural GDP and rainfall.
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Eynde (2011) who estimates an elasticity between Monsoon rainfall and grain-
production of 0.45 and an elasticity of rainfall with respect to civilian casualties of
0.88. In appendix tables A3 and A4 I perform a whole range of robustness checks
highlighting that the results are robust to the choice of empirical model, adding a
battery of further controls and the choice of rainfall measure to alleviate concerns
raised in this literature e.g. by Ciccone (2011). An IV approach using a vegetation
index instrumented by rainfall as performed in Kapur et al. (2012) yields very
similar results to what they find.
In the next step, I discuss the endogenous nature of the roll-out of NREGA,
highlighting however, that it appears not to be endogenous with regard to my
identifying assumption.
6.2 NREGA Introduction: Endogeneity of Treatment
As already indicated in section 2, the sequence of the roll out of NREGA is highly
endogenous. This is an important caveat to bear in mind when trying to make
causal claims exploiting variation stemming from the fact that NREGA was grad-
ually rolled out in different phases. Table 2 confirms that roll-out of NREGA was
highly endogenous to a set of district level characteristics, presenting results from
specification 2.
It is evident that districts that were violent in 2004 were more likely to receive
NREGA in the first rounds. The coefficient is consistently negative, when adding
more controls, but remains statistically only marginally significant (which is due
to the choice of standard errors). The endogeneity of NREGA roll-out - espe-
cially to Naxalite violence - has been highlighted by Zimmermann (2012). Other
characteristics that correlate well with the order of roll out are a high population
share of scheduled castes or scheduled tribe population. High wages, high agri-
cultural output per capita and a high literacy predict treatment in later rounds.
The most important coefficient for my purpose is presented in the second row.
Using the constructed district level measure of the elasticity of Monsoon rainfall
with respect to agricultural GDP, θd as a control. This elasticity measures the lo-
cal responsiveness of agricultural output to local Monsoon rainfall and is thus, a
measure of the extent to which rainfall shocks affect local incomes. In none of the
specifications does this measure gain any significance. This gives me confidence
that NREGA roll out was not endogenous to the way that rainfall translates into
output, while it very well endogenous to production levels and a whole range of
other covariates. I will now proceed to present the results indicating how the func-
tional relationship between rainfall and conflict fundamentally changed following
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the introduction of NREGA.
6.3 After NREGA: Moderation of Violence
Table 3 provides the results indicating how the functional relationship between
Monsoon rainfall and agricultural output, wages, violence intensity and incidence
changed with the introduction of NREGA. The results are stark. Columns (1)
and (2) indicate that the agricultural production function has not fundamentally
changed with the introduction of NREGA. The interaction coefficient is positive
but insignificant at conventional significance levels, indicating that agricultural
output is still highly rainfall dependent. Columns (3) and (4) focus on agricul-
tural wages. The results are stark, indicating that the introduction of NREGA
has removed the pass-through of rainfall on agricultural wages, thus insulting the
latter from this source of variation. This is not surprising: NREGA is primarily
a program to create employment opportunities and thus, may only indirectly af-
fect the underlying agricultural production function, making it more resilient to
weather variability due to investment in micro-irrigation facilities.
The last four present the core results. The introduction of NREGA has re-
moved the rainfall dependence of the intensity and incidence of conflict almost
throughout (see columns (5)-(8)). Before exploring the underlying mechanisms,
I highlight that the results are very robust to alternative ways of looking at the
data.
Robustness There are three core robustness checks that I perform for the three
main outcome variables. Firstly, I add a set of control variables interacted with
a set of time-fixed effects. These control variables include agricultural GDP per
capita before 2005, scheduled cast population share, share of literate population,
scheduled tribe population share, elevation, household size, the gender gap and
most importantly, the estimated elasticity between agricultural output and Mon-
soon rainfall at district level. As some of these variables varied systematically
across the NREGA phases, this allows me to flexibly control for trends that are
specific to these variables.
The second set of exercises are placebo checks. First, I study rainfall outside
the Monsoon season. This rain only had marginal effect on agricultural output
as indicated in section 6.1. Hence, one would not expect that the introduction of
NREGA correlates in any significant way with this rainfall variable.
The second placebo moves the NREGA reform three years ahead of time. This
is possible as the conflict data begins in mid 2000. This serves as a check to
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whether the change in the relationship between rainfall, wages and conflict had
already happened before NREGA was introduced and thus, serves as a means to
check for common trends.
The robustness checks for agricultural wages and output are presented in table
4. For the agricultural wages, I also estimate the interaction effect for wages
in harvesting season as opposed to the planting season. This suggests that the
moderation effect is coming from the harvesting activity wages, which are relevant
after the Monsoon.
The robustness checks for the NREGA effect regressions are presented in ta-
ble 5. The first column restricts the analysis to the districts that had been violent
before NREGA was introduced. The estimated effect is very similar from the
main specification. The second and third columns perform the placebo tests as
described, while in the fourth column I add the district specific controls inter-
acted with a set of year fixed effects. This is an attempt to control for the set of
variables that were driving selection into the different NREGA phases. The esti-
mated coefficients do not change significantly. This is not completely unexpected
as the elasticity of income with respect to rainfall, which I argue, is driving the
relationship with violence was not a selection criteria. The last column studies
contemporaneous Monsoon rain. The coefficients point in similar directions but
do not gain significance.
NREGA Effect over Time All in all, these results suggest that the relation-
ship between rainfall and violence changes after the introduction of NREGA. This
suggests that there is some effect of the NREGA on the dynamics of violence. A
key concern with the above specification however is, that the relationship between
rainfall and violence may have been changing over time, independently from the
introduction of NREGA - i.e. there could be time-specific changes to the way
that rainfall translates into violence, that are independent of NREGA, but may be
picked up by the interaction term. In order to address this concern, I estimate a
very flexible specification, where I allow the effect of rainfall on violence to be a
different for each quarter of each year.25
The specification I estimate is
25That is to say since the sample period is 2000q2 to 2012q4, I estimate 50 individual rainfall effect
coefficients.
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E(Apcdt) = δd exp(bpct + αTdpt +∑
t
ηtRdt−1
+
3
∑
p=1
ηpRdt−1 +
3
∑
p=1
γpTdptPpRdt−1 + X′dtß + ecpdt)
This specification still allows for the estimation of a phase-specific rainfall-
effect ηp and also a phase-specific NREGA effect γp, as the way that rainfall
translates into violence may be different across phases, which is not picked up
by the simple time specific effects ηt which are homogeneous across the three
phases. The results from this specification are best presented graphically. Figure
3 plots the overall effect by NREGA phase, which is simply the linear constraint:
ηˆt + ηˆp + γˆpTpt.
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Figure 3: The Effect of Monsoon rain on Violence over Time for Phase 1, Phase 2 and
Phase 3 districts from left to right.
It becomes evident that this more demanding specification confirms the previ-
ous findings that suggest that the relationship between rainfall and violence has
changed after the introduction of NREGA. The graphs for districts in the first and
second phase look very similar with negative overall effects before NREGA and
insignificant effects afterwards, suggesting that the overall effect is driven by dis-
tricts in the first two phases, which were - poorer on average - and thus, are the
districts where one would expect NREGA to have the largest effect.
I now explore whether the reduced form findings can be reconciled with evi-
dence on NREGA take-up, the targeting of violent acts and present some estimates
of an overall level effect.
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7 Mechanisms
7.1 NREGA Take-up Behavior
I proceed by studying whether NREGA take-up behaviour follows a similar pat-
tern suggested by an opportunity cost argument. If NREGA provides a safe out-
side option in dire times, this should be reflected in increased take-up following an
adverse shock. The results are presented in table 6. The fist column measures the
log of total person-days in employment created in a financial year. The elasticity
between rainfall and participation is strongly negative. This overall take-up ef-
fect is decomposed into extensive- and intensive margin participation in columns
(2) and (3). The extensive margin measures the share of households who partici-
pate. Since the program is provided on a per-household level, this is the correct
way to measure extensive margin participation. Column (2) suggests that a one
percent increase in rainfall reduces the share of households who participate by
0.05% and intensive margin participation by 0.118%. The instrumental variables
result suggest a unit elasticity between agricultural GDP per capita and inten-
sive margin NREGA participation. This high elasticity could be driven through
a general equilibrium effect, as low production drives up prices and may actu-
ally depress real incomes, leading to additional demand for NREGA employment
through that general equilibrium effect. Columns (4) and (5) look at how the
costs of active NREGA projects in a district at the end of a financial year respond
to passed Monsoon realisation. The point estimates for both, costs on irrigation
projects and all projects are very similar to the costs of overall participation. Since
at least 60% of the costs must be budgeted to cover labour expenses, the similarity
of the coefficients with the coefficient in column (1) is very plausible. The simi-
larity of the coefficients in column (4) and (5) suggests furthermore, that adverse
rainfall realisation do not predict NREGA project activity for irrigation purposes
differentially.
Robustness In table 7 I present some robustness checks of the relationship be-
tween rainfall and NREGA take-up. In particular, in the first two columns I con-
strain the analysis to the years where the data-source is common pre 2011. The
coefficients are slightly higher but very similar to the previous findings. Columns
(3) and (4) include some further controls. In column (3) its most notable that rain-
fall outside the Monsoon has only a very weak or insignificant effect; this is as
expected as rainfall outside the Monsoon season did not seem to predict wages or
production strongly. Contemporaneous Monsoon, however, has a strong effect on
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NREGA take-up as well as lagged Monsoon. This is due to the way that NREGA
data is reported on a financial-year calendar with goes from April to March and
so, contemporaneous Monsoon rain may affect take-up up to March of the subse-
quent year. Column (4) includes the set of district specific controls identified as
important selection criteria for the roll-out interacted with a set of time-fixed ef-
fects. The coefficient drops quite a lot, but still remains significant at the 5% level.
In column (5) and (6) I focus on take-up by scheduled cast/ scheduled tribe pop-
ulations. Since the Naxalites recruit some of their supporters from among these
populations, its important to see whether the take-up by these subpopulations
follows a similar pattern. The results confirm that this is indeed the case.
In order to corrobate these findings on take-up, I estimate the above specifica-
tion using the constructed monthly participation data from the reported monthly
cumulative figures. This data is quite noisy due to reporting lags, especially in
the earlier years. Months with missing data are dropped.
I estimate the following specification:
Ppcdt = δdk + bpct +
12
∑
i=1
ηiRdt + epcdt (8)
This provides a set of coefficients ηi that can be plotted to trace out the impact
of Monsoon season rainfall on NEGA participation across different months from
the beginning of calendar year up until its end. The results are depicted in figure
4.
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Figure 4: NREGA Month-on-Month Take-up and Monsoon Rainfall
The graph suggests that Monsoon rainfall begins to reduce NREGA participa-
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tion from May onwards. As Monsoon onset in some parts of India is as early as
May, this makes sense. The effect of Monsoon rainfall on participation is strongest
from August onwards, as the Monsoon begins to withdraw. The results are very
suggestive: in the high agricultural season, fed by good rainfall, there are ample
employment opportunities available, which reduces NREGA participation. This
effect persists even into the Rabi season in November and December.
In the next section, I explore what types of violence appear to become less
rainfall dependent with the introduction of NREGA.
7.2 Targets of Violence
A question that has started to arise in the economic analysis of the drivers of con-
flict lies behind who is the actual target of violence. Vanden Eynde (2011) argues
that civilians, facing an income shock, find themselves torn between becoming
police informers, which offers some economic benefits. This comes however, at
a cost, as insurgents react with more violence against civilians. Hence, a natural
question that arises is what type of violence is particularly income-dependent and
how does this change following the introduction of the employment guarantee.
The conflict data allows a rough classification of the subject of violent activities
into groups: civilians, security forces and terrorists. In Fetzer (2013) I highlight
how this is done with the aid of humans to classify ambiguous cases.
Columns (1) to (3) of table 8 performs the analysis of the NREGA effect, break-
ing up the violence data into the different classes. The pattern that emerges is very
suggestive. While all types of violence is responsive to lagged Monsoon, the mod-
erating effect of NREGA is most strongly seen for violence targeted against civil-
ians in column (1). In column (2), the NREGA effect is visible as well; however, the
sum of the two coefficients actually is positive, which could suggest that violence
against security forces is becoming pro-cyclical as opposed to counter-cyclical.
The sum of the two coefficients is insignificant however. The third column looks
at incidences where the subject of the incidence were terrorists. There appears to
be only a weak moderating effect of NREGA.
Column (4) presents results on the share of incidences with subjects classified
as civilians. The coefficients confirm what columns (2) and (3) indicate: NREGA
could help bring civilians out of the line of fire. As a consequence, this could free
up resources for the insurgents that were previously used to extort civilians and
allow increased targeted violence against the state and its institutions.
While this is an open question that remains to be addressed by future research,
I attempt to combine the preceding findings to provide a rough estimate of the
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overall level effect of NREGA.
7.3 Separating Level and Dynamic Effects of NREGA
The preceding results suggested that NREGA does have a moderating effect on
the cyclical nature of violence, in particular, the violence targeted against civil-
ians. However, the existing literature evaluating the economic impacts of NREGA
also indicate strong increases in wage levels.26 In the context of the conceptual
framework, such an increase in wage levels can be seen as an increase in the re-
turns to labour in both, good- and bad states of the world. This - of course - does
have an independent level effect on violence, as it shifts the overall participation
constraint. However, the underlying opportunity cost mechanism is still intact,
suggesting that there is an independent effect stemming from the stabilisation of
agricultural incomes in the bad state It is challenging to identify a level effect, due
to the endogeneity of the roll-out. More importantly, any study focusing on the
level effect by interpreting the NREGA treatment indicator as such, actually finds
a mixture between the level effect due to higher wage levels irrespective of the
state of the world, and the effect stemming from a reduced income elasticity of
conflict.
The following exercises aim to highlight the importance of taking into account
the insurance mechanism that is the focus of this paper. I estimate the following
specifications while imposing various constraints:
E(Acdt) = δd exp (bct + αTdt + ηRdpt−1 + γTdt × Rdt−1 + X′dtß + ecdt) (9)
where bct are now region by time fixed effects, rather than region by phase and
time fixed effects. This set of fixed effects allows the estimation of the parameter α,
which can be interpreted as the level effect of NREGA if we are willing to assume
that the roll-out of NREGA was exogenuous.
I estimate a constrained version of specification 9, requiring that η = γ. In this
case, I force the effect of rainfall to be the same before and after the introduction
of NREGA. I also estimate a specification with the constraint η = γ = 0, which
effectively means not controlling for rainfall. The key question is how this will
affect the estimated coefficient αˆ. In both cases, the coefficient αˆ should overstate
the effect of NREGA in absolute value.
26See Zimmermann (2012), Berg et al. (2012), Imbert and Papp (2012) and Azam (2011).
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The results are presented in table 9. The first column presents the constrained
regression where I do not control for rainfall. The level effect coefficient is nega-
tive and statistically significant. In the second column, I control for rainfall, which
renders the coefficient slightly larger in absolute value. The third column is the
unconstrained coefficient, allowing the functional relationship between rainfall
and conflict to change with the introduction of NREGA. The interesting observa-
tion is that the coefficient on the level effect goes down and is estimated relatively
imprecisely, moving from a p-value close to 0.001 to p-value of 0.45. This suggests
that the dynamic effect of NREGA, operating by mitigating income shocks, is be-
ing partially captured in estimates of αˆ, when one does not explicitly control for
this important economic channel through which NREGA operates.
Despite this, any estimate of αˆ is plagued by the fact that the NREGA in-
troduction was endogenous to violence levels and many other observable and
unobservable covariates. Thus, any estimate of a effect should be taken with a
grain of salt. Nevertheless, in table 10 I present results of the level effect, con-
trolling explicitly for rainfall and its interaction with NREGA. The results I find
are broadly consistent with Dasgupta (2014), who estimate effects of NREGA on
levels of Maoist violence.
The first column presents the basic level effect estimate of contemporaneous
treatment. The second column adds lagged effects of the NREGA treatment indi-
cator, suggesting that the first lag is highly significant. The point estimate suggest
that the introduction of NREGA reduced levels of violence by between 30% to
50%. The third column adds the district characteristics interacted with time-fixed
effects. The estimated effect increases in absolute value. Columns (4)-(9) explore
the heterogeneity of the estimated effect by interacting the treatment indicator
with a set of district-characteristics that have been identified to matter for the
sequence of roll out. Important covariates are the age only statistically signifi-
cant heterogeneity is for the scheduled tribe population share, suggesting that the
level effect is weaker for districts with a high scheduled caste population share.
Furthermore, indicative is the coefficient on average household size. This sug-
gests that the level effect is significantly weaker for districts with a larger average
household size. This is not too unsurprising, since the NREGA program provides
an allowance for 100 days of work per household. Hence, larger households are dis-
advantaged in that respect. Column (8) interacts the treatment indicator with the
log of the mean level of agricultural GDP per capita before 2005. The coefficient
is insignificant. While the results on the dynamics of conflict do not square with
Khanna and Zimmermann (2013), the estimated level effects do stand at odds with
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the ones estimated in their paper. Clearly, they focus on the short-run effects of
the scheme’s introduction which may have lead to more police presence and thus,
more violence targeted against police. Table 11 presents results when estimating
the level effect of NREGA, splitting up the attacks into ones with civilian, secu-
rity force or insurgent subjects. As suggested by the results on the dynamics of
conflict, the level effect appears to come in its entirety from less violence targeted
against civilians.
8 Conclusion
This paper has set out to investigate the impact of the NREGA Workfare Program
on the dynamics of violence in Indian intra-state conflicts. I find that the income
dependency of violence has decreased significantly following the introduction of
the public employment scheme, suggesting that one of the key drivers of insur-
gency violence can be moderated through the effective introduction and provision
of social insurance. This indicates that a possible tool to affect the dynamics of
violence in conflict torn areas is the introduction of a social insurance system that
provides stable outside options in times of need. The key design feature that en-
ables NREGA to function as such is, that it is entirely demand driven. The then
shows that the observed NREGA effects are plausible when studying NREGA
participation data; furthermore, there appears to be a general equilibrium effect
of NREGA on agricultural wages as well - stabilising wages when these otherwise
would be depressed due to adverse weather conditions.
The paper contributes to the growing literature that evaluates how infrastruc-
ture, technology or other types of institutions can moderate the links between
income and criminal activity in general. While a vast literature has emerged that
tries to evaluate the insulating effects of physical infrastructure on incomes, the
literature that evaluates its implications for conflict is still at an early stage.
There are some important open questions however. If NREGA drove up the
opportunity cost of conflict and thus, the implicit wages for insurgents, does this
induce insurgents to shift away from labour intensive means to inflict violence
towards more capital intensive ones? This has been studied by Iyengar et al. (2011)
in the context of a labour market intervention in Iraq. Since NREGA has been
identified to drive up wage levels, this is an important question to be explored
further. Similarly, as it appeared that the dynamic as well as the level effect is
mainly driven by less violence against civilians, what are the effects on violence
against the Indian state or its security forces? Not having to inflict violence against
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civilians in order to prevent them turning into police informants could free up
significant resources for the insurgents, enabling to direct more violence against
the state. In fact, there is some anecdotal evidence suggesting that Naxalites are
increasingly targeting urban populations.27
Last but not least, the NREGA program may have implications for the insur-
gents extortion base as well. This has not been explored in this paper, but the
evidence collected by Vanden Eynde (2011) suggests that violence in places with
a stable tax base has distinct patterns for the types of violence inflicted. Stabilised
rural incomes could indirectly, by stabilising the extortion base, strengthen the
insurgents fighting capacity.
27See for example http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-08-13/news/
41375368_1_urban-areas-cpi-organisations, accessed 12.12.2013 or Magioncalda (2010).
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Tables for the Main Text
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Table 1: Before the Introduction of NREGA: Reduced Form Relationship between Rainfall, Agricultural Production,
Wages and Violence
Agricultural GDP Agricultural Wages Violence Intensity Violence Incidence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Annual Rain Monsoon Annual Rain Monsoon Annual Rain Monsoon Annual Rain Monsoon
Rainfall 0.537*** 0.362*** 0.060** 0.058*** -0.989** -0.866*** -0.020** -0.022***
(0.114) (0.086) (0.025) (0.018) (0.421) (0.270) (0.009) (0.007)
Observations 3239 3239 1419 1419 2841 2841 12657 12657
Number of Districts 471 471 314 314 148 148 543 543
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS Poisson Poisson OLS OLS
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time fixed effects and district fixed effects. Agricultural GDP is in logs and measured in per capita
terms using the 2001 Census population data. Agricultural wages is the average annual field worker wages in logs. Columns (5) - (7) use the
one year lagged values of rainfall. For the linear models, standard errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley
(1999). Spatial autocorrelation is assumed to linearly decrease in distance up to a cutoff of 500 km. District distances are computed from district
centroids. Poisson regressions present standard errors clustered at the district level, stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 2: NREGA Introduction: Endogeneity of NREGA Rollout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Any Violence -0.474 -0.394 -0.370 -0.425 -0.237 -0.287 -0.166 -0.247
(0.353) (0.278) (0.284) (0.304) (0.234) (0.219) (0.165) (0.219)
Elasticity θ -0.014 -0.016 0.001 -0.003 -0.006 -0.015 0.010
(0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016)
Agricultural GDP per 0.072 0.097** 0.112* 0.125* 0.143** 0.150***
Capita (0.095) (0.048) (0.065) (0.068) (0.057) (0.043)
Mean Agricultural 0.962*** 0.388***
Wage (0.240) (0.124)
Share Literate 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.028***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.010)
Scheduled Cast Share -0.008 -0.030*** -0.019***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
Scheduled Tribe -0.014*** -0.017***
Share (0.004) (0.005)
Number of Districts 544 470 470 213 470 470 470 213
Notes: Cross sectional regressions of district level controls on treatment-phase indicator. All time varying measures
such as violence and agricultural GDP were measured in 2004, when the Planning Commission presented its latest
report on backwardness. Standard errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999).
Spatial autocorrelation is assumed to linearly decrease in distance up to a cutoff of 500 km. District distances are
computed from district centroids, stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
37
Table 3: After the Introduction of NREGA: Reduced Form Relationship between Rainfall, Agricultural Production, Wages
and Violence
Agricultural GDP Agricultural Wages Violence Intensity Violence Incidence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Annual Rain Monsoon Annual Rain Monsoon Annual Rain Monsoon Annual Rain Monsoon
Monsoon Rain 0.504*** 0.374*** 0.064*** 0.062*** -1.195*** -1.330*** -0.031** -0.035***
(0.099) (0.078) (0.021) (0.019) (0.445) (0.306) (0.015) (0.013)
NREGA x Monsoon Rain -0.076 -0.132 -0.089*** -0.086*** 1.100** 1.098*** 0.032*** 0.032***
(0.091) (0.083) (0.017) (0.016) (0.509) (0.388) (0.012) (0.010)
F-Test 3.68*** 2.52*** -1.2 -1.3 -.41 -1.11 .06 -.21
Observations 4480 4480 2455 2455 8868 8868 25521 25521
Number of Districts 471 471 336 336 217 217 543 543
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS Poisson Poisson OLS OLS
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time fixed effects and district fixed effects. Columns (5) - (7) use the one year lagged values of rainfall.
For the linear models, standard errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999). Spatial autocorrelation is assumed to
linearly decrease in distance up to a cutoff of 500 km. District distances are computed from district centroids. Poisson regressions present standard
errors clustered at the district level. Stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 4: After the Introduction of NREGA: Robustness of the Moderating Effect of NREGA on Agricultural Production and
Wages
Agricultural GDP Agricultural Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Placebo Rain Placebo Reform Controls Placebo Rain Placebo Reform Controls Harvesting Planting
Monsoon 0.073 0.364*** 0.349*** -0.015 0.049 0.058*** 0.051** 0.030
(0.049) (0.079) (0.078) (0.012) (0.032) (0.019) (0.022) (0.026)
NREGA x Monsoon 0.037 -0.020 -0.092 0.044*** -0.018 -0.098*** -0.069*** -0.040
(0.028) (0.062) (0.067) (0.012) (0.026) (0.017) (0.027) (0.031)
Observations 4480 4480 4480 2455 2455 2428 1987 1987
Number of Districts 471 471 471 336 336 331 280 280
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time fixed effects and district fixed effects. Columns (1) and (4) use the rainfall outside the Monsoon
season for a placebo test. Columns (2) and (5) present the results when shifting the reform 3 years ahead of time. Column (3) and (6) include a
set of district characteristics interacted with a full set of time fixed effects as well as the NREGA treatment indicator. The district characteristics
include the log of agricultural GDP per capita for the years prior to 2005, scheduled cast population share, share of literate population, scheduled
tribe population share, household size and the gender gap. Standard errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999).
Spatial autocorrelation is assumed to linearly decrease in distance up to a cutoff of 500 km. District distances are computed from district centroids,
stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 5: After the Introduction of NREGA: Robustness of the Moderating Effect of NREGA on Vio-
lence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Previously Violent Placebo Rain Placebo Reform Controls Contemporaneuous
Monsoon Rain -1.289*** -0.067 -0.918** -1.508*** -0.798***
(0.311) (0.258) (0.406) (0.257) (0.309)
NREGA x Monsoon 1.044*** 0.104 0.334 1.770*** 0.515
(0.402) (0.310) (0.400) (0.332) (0.363)
District Controls No No No Yes No
Observations 6194 8868 8868 8733 9716
Number of Districts 151 217 217 214 222
Notes: All regressions are estimated using a pseduo-maximum likelihood estimator, whose moment conditions coincide
with a Poisson model. The dependent variable throughout is the number of terrorist incidences. All regressions include
region-phase-time fixed effects and district fixed effects. Columns (1) restricts the analysis to all districts that were violent
before the introduction of NREGA. Column (2) uses the rain outside the Monsoon season as a placebo, while column
(3) estimates the effect of a false NREGA reform three years before the actual one. Column (4) includes a set of district
characteristics interacted with a full set of time fixed effects as well as the NREGA treatment indicator. The district
characteristics include the log of agricultural GDP per capita for the years prior to 2005, scheduled cast population share,
share of literate population, scheduled tribe population share, household size and the gender gap. Column (5) uses
contemporaneous Monsoon rainfall. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are given in the parentheses
with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 6: NREGA Introduction: Relationship between Rainfall and NREGA Takeup
NREGA Takeup Costs of Active Projects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Overall Extensive Margin Intensive Margin All Projects Irrigation Projects
Reduced Form:
Monsoon rain -0.216*** -0.055*** -0.118** -0.231** -0.237**
(0.076) (0.014) (0.056) (0.102) (0.104)
Observations 3066 3060 3066 2825 2741
Number of Districts 538 537 538 501 500
Instrumental Variables:
Agricultural GDP per -1.647*** -0.312*** -1.063*** -1.484** -1.891**
Capita (0.468) (0.104) (0.372) (0.616) (0.794)
First Stage 22.7 22.6 22.7 18.2 16.8
Mean of Dependent Variable 14.7 .351 3.66 7.19 5.82
Observations 1664 1662 1664 1477 1414
Number of Districts 455 455 455 408 397
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time fixed effects and district fixed effects. Column (1) uses the log of the cu-
mulative person days until the end of a financial year as dependent variable, while column (2) uses the share of households
that demanded employment as a dependent variable. The dependent variable in column (3) is the log of the number of days
per household. Columns (4) and (5) use the log of the total costs of ongoing projects. All rainfall variables are lagged. The
instrumental variables result use the lagged Monsoon rainfall as instrument for lagged agricultural output. “First Stage” is an F
statistic for weak identification, reporting the minimum of either the Cragg-Donald or Kleibergen-Paap test statistic. Standard
errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999). Spatial autocorrelation is assumed to linearly
decrease in distance up to a cutoff of 500 km. District distances are computed from district centroids, stars indicate *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 7: NREGA Introduction: Relationship between Rainfall and NREGA Takeup
Just MPR Data Controls Scheduled Caste / Tribe Takeup
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall Projects Weather Controls Overall Weather
Lagged:
Monsoon rain -0.316*** -0.276** -0.318*** -0.325*** -0.171** -0.274***
(0.092) (0.136) (0.084) (0.087) (0.078) (0.091)
Outside Monsoon rain -0.080* -0.078** -0.077*
(0.042) (0.036) (0.039)
Hot days -0.710 -0.837 -0.644
(0.724) (0.528) (0.684)
Contemporaneuous:
Monsoon rain -0.428*** -0.471*** -0.412***
(0.109) (0.098) (0.112)
Hot days -0.442 -0.628 0.031
(0.640) (0.498) (0.619)
Outside Monsoon -0.023 -0.045 -0.044
(0.045) (0.046) (0.041)
District Controls No No No Yes No Yes
Observations 2079 1845 3066 3066 3061 3061
Number of Districts 535 479 538 538 538 538
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time fixed effects and district fixed effects. Column (1) and (2)
restrict the sample to cover only the period before the MIS data collection system was implemented. Column
(3) adds contemporaneous weather controls in addition to the lagged ones. Column (4) and (6) include a set of
district characteristics interacted with a full set of time fixed effects as well as the NREGA treatment indicator.
The district characteristics include the log of agricultural GDP per capita for the years prior to 2005, scheduled
cast population share, share of literate population, scheduled tribe population share, household size and the
gender gap. Column (5) and (6) restrict the analysis to estimate the responsiveness of overall participation by
scheduled caste or scheduled tribes. Standard errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in
Conley (1999). Spatial autocorrelation is assumed to linearly decrease in distance up to a cutoff of 500 km. District
distances are computed from district centroids, stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 8: NREGA and the Targets of Violence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Civilians Security Forces Terrorists Share of Civilian
Monsoon -1.517*** -1.076*** -1.033*** -0.134**
(0.335) (0.396) (0.362) (0.053)
NREGA x Monsoon 1.445*** 1.419*** 0.596 0.094**
(0.407) (0.505) (0.399) (0.041)
NREGA -0.686**
(0.287)
Observations 7894 5111 6220 2521
Number of Districts 197 136 150 217
Notes: All regressions are estimated using a pseduo-maximum likelihood estimator,
whose moment conditions coincide with a Poisson model. The dependent variable
in columns (1)-(3) is the number of incidents where the subject of the incident has
been coded to be either a civilian, security force or terrorist. Column (4) uses the
share of incidents with civilian targets. Regressions (1) - (3) include region by phase-
time fixed effects and district fixed effects, while column (4) uses time- and district
fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are given in the
parentheses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table 9: Dynamic Versus Direct Level Effect of
NREGA
(1) (2) (3)
η = γ = 0 η = γ Unconstrained
NREGA -0.427*** -0.481*** -0.334**
(0.164) (0.174) (0.167)
Monsoon Rain -0.766*** -1.609***
(0.233) (0.343)
NREGA x Monsoon 1.305***
(0.351)
Observations 9597 9597 9597
Number of Districts 217 217 217
Notes: All regressions are estimated using a pseduo-maximum
likelihood estimator, whose moment conditions coincide with a
Poisson model. The dependent variable is the number of violent
incidences per quarter. All regressions include time fixed effects,
district fixed effects. The first column does not control for rain-
fall, while the second column constraints the rainfall coefficient
to be the same before, and after the introduction of NREGA. Ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the district level are given in
the parentheses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1.
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Table 10: Level Effect of NREGA
Level Effect Estimates Heterogeneity of Level Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
NREGA -0.334** -0.263* -0.492** -0.949*** -0.756*** -0.480** -0.479*** -0.463** -0.462*
(0.167) (0.148) (0.197) (0.231) (0.266) (0.204) (0.173) (0.197) (0.263)
NREGAt-1 -0.468**
(0.194)
Heterogeneity: NREGA ×
Scheduled Tribe 0.246*** 0.300***
(0.063) (0.100)
Scheduled Caste -0.434 0.867*
(0.323) (0.483)
Literacy -0.541 -0.238
(0.850) (0.784)
Agricultural GDP Before 2005 1.063 2.498*
(1.519) (1.397)
Householdsize 3.164*** 3.067***
(1.163) (1.051)
NREGA Dynamic Effect
Monsoon Rain -1.609*** -1.572*** -1.858*** -1.846*** -1.885*** -1.856*** -2.002*** -1.840*** -1.875***
(0.343) (0.337) (0.422) (0.412) (0.420) (0.419) (0.425) (0.421) (0.414)
NREGA x Monsoon 1.305*** 1.337*** 1.584*** 1.571*** 1.660*** 1.568*** 1.852*** 1.550*** 1.585***
(0.351) (0.356) (0.485) (0.461) (0.475) (0.479) (0.487) (0.486) (0.467)
District Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9597 9597 8248 8248 8248 8248 8248 8248 8248
Number of Districts 217 217 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
Notes: All regressions are estimated using a pseduo-maximum likelihood estimator, whose moment conditions coincide with a Poisson
model. The dependent variable is the number of violent incidences per quarter. All regressions include region by time fixed effect and
district fixed effects. “District Controls” includes a full set of cross sectional district characteristics interacted with time fixed effects. The
district characteristics include the log of agricultural GDP per capita for the years prior to 2005, scheduled cast population share, share of
literate population, scheduled tribe population share, household size and the gender gap. Robust standard errors clustered at the district
level are given in the parentheses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 11: Level Effect of NREGA and Targets of Violence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall Civilians Security Forces Terrorists
NREGA -0.573*** -0.657*** -0.194 -0.436
(0.200) (0.208) (0.263) (0.266)
District Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8836 7896 5170 5922
Number of Districts 188 168 110 126
Notes: All regressions are estimated using a pseduo-maximum likelihood
estimator, whose moment conditions coincide with a Poisson model. The
dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the number of incidents where the
subject of the incident has been coded to be either a civilian, security force
or terrorist. All regressions include time- and district fixed effects. “District
Controls” includes a full set of cross sectional district characteristics inter-
acted with time fixed effects. The district characteristics include the log of
agricultural GDP per capita for the years prior to 2005, scheduled cast pop-
ulation share, share of literate population, scheduled tribe population share,
household size and the gender gap. Robust standard errors clustered at the
district level are given in the parentheses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A1: Before the Introduction of NREGA: Robustness of Relationship between Weather Vari-
ables and Agricultural Output
Agricultural GDP Grain Production
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outside Monsoon Temperature Controls Outside Monsoon Temperature Controls
Monsoon 0.364*** 0.357*** 0.293*** 0.369*** 0.367*** 0.234***
(0.086) (0.086) (0.075) (0.076) (0.076) (0.057)
Outside Monsoon 0.122** 0.114***
(0.051) (0.043)
Hotdays -1.047 -0.290
(0.653) (0.509)
Vegetation Index 6.621*** 7.394***
(1.072) (1.000)
Nightlights -0.061 -0.061
(0.207) (0.133)
District Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 3239 3239 3239 3196 3196 3196
Number of Districts 471 471 471 464 464 464
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time fixed effects and district fixed effects. Hotdays measures the number
of days per year with average temperatures above 30◦. Vegetation Index is the annual MODIS Satellite Normalised
Vegetation Index that may serve as a proxy for forest cover or agricultural productivity. Nightlights measures the share
of the district that emits stable night lights in a given year. “District Controls” includes a full set of cross sectional
district characteristics interacted with time fixed effects. The district characteristics include the log of agricultural
GDP per capita for the years prior to 2005, scheduled cast population share, share of literate population, scheduled
tribe population share, household size and the gender gap. Standard errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence
as modelled in Conley (1999). Spatial autocorrelation is assumed to linearly decrease in distance up to a cutoff of 500
km. District distances are computed from district centroids, stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A2: Before the Introduction of NREGA: Robustness of Relationship be-
tween Weather Variables and Agricultural Wages
Annual Wages Seasonal Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outside Monsoon Temperature Controls Harvesting Planting
Monsoon 0.058*** 0.060*** 0.053*** 0.046* 0.010
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.028) (0.017)
Outside Monsoon 0.006
(0.011)
Hotdays 0.265
(0.162)
Vegetation Index -0.170
(0.256)
Nightlights -0.119*
(0.065)
District Controls No Yes Yes No No
Observations 1419 1419 1419 1387 1195
Number of Districts 314 314 314 318 260
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time fixed effects and district fixed effects. Hot-
days measures the number of days per year with average temperatures above 30◦. Vegetation
Index is the annual MODIS Satellite Normalised Vegetation Index that may serve as a proxy
for forest cover. Nightlights measures the share of the district that emits stable night lights
in a given year. “District Controls” includes a full set of cross sectional district characteristics
interacted with time fixed effects. The district characteristics include the log of agricultural
GDP per capita for the years prior to 2005, scheduled cast population share, share of literate
population, scheduled tribe population share, household size and the gender gap. Standard
errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999). Spatial autocor-
relation is assumed to linearly decrease in distance up to a cutoff of 500 km. District distances
are computed from district centroids, stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A3: Before the Introduction of NREGA: Robustness of Relationship between Weather Variables and Conflict
Robustness to Choice of Empirical Model Robustness to Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Poisson-IV Poisson Negative Binomial OLS Non-Monsoon Rain Further Weather District Controls
Lagged:
Agricultural GDP -2.427**
(0.989)
Monsoon Rain -0.855*** -0.796*** -0.091*** -0.962*** -0.656**
(0.272) (0.205) (0.031) (0.296) (0.289)
Outside Monsoon Rain -0.205 -0.273 -0.174
(0.211) (0.212) (0.215)
Hotdays 2.212 1.646
(1.853) (2.128)
Contemporaneuous:
Monsoon Rain 0.303 0.384
(0.276) (0.319)
Hotdays 2.778 1.489
(2.083) (1.905)
District Trends No No No No No No Yes
Observations 2213 2841 3312 12657 2841 2841 2630
Number of Districts 120 148 148 543 148 148 143
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time fixed effects and district fixed effects. Column (1) presents the results of an IV regression, instrumenting
lagged agricultural GDP per capita with lagged Monsoon rainfall. Column (3) presents a negative-binomial model with bootstrapped standard errors.
Hotdays measures the number of days per year with average temperatures above 30◦. “District Controls” includes a full set of cross sectional district
characteristics interacted with time fixed effects. The district characteristics include the log of agricultural GDP per capita for the years prior to 2005,
scheduled cast population share, share of literate population, scheduled tribe population share, household size and the gender gap. Robust standard errors
clustered at the district level are given in the parentheses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A4: Before the Introduction of NREGA: Robustness of Relationship between Weather Variables and
Conflict
Rainfall Measures Temperature Vegetation Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deficiency Normalised Deficiency Days above 30◦ Temperature OLS IV
Monsoon rain 1.033*** -0.192***
(0.281) (0.046)
Days above 2.740
30◦ (1.770)
Average Monsoon 0.514**
Temperature (0.261)
Vegetation -13.534** -83.822***
(5.914) (26.670)
Observations 2841 2841 2841 2841 2841 2841
Number of Districts 148 148 148 148 148 148
Estimation Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time fixed effects and district fixed effects. Hotdays measures the number of days
per year with average temperatures above 30◦. Column (6) presents an IV model, instrumenting the lagged vegetation index
with lagged monsoon rainfall as suggested by Kapur et al. (2012). Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are given
in the parentheses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A5: NREGA Introduction: Relationship between Rainfall and NREGA Takeup
MPR Data Ongoing Project Costs Temperature, Trends and Controls Other Project Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All Projects Irrigiation Projects Trends Nightlights Weather Controls Active Costs Active Count
Monsoon rain -0.244** -0.270** -0.153* -0.211*** -0.292*** -0.134** -0.071
(0.111) (0.132) (0.079) (0.082) (0.091) (0.057) (0.056)
Days above -2.174***
30◦ (0.758)
Night Lights -0.058
(0.249)
Monsoon rain -0.228**
(contemporaneuous) (0.101)
Days above -1.263**
30◦ (contemporaneuous) (0.600)
District Time Trend No No Yes No No No No
Observations 1849 1775 2897 2897 2897 2897 2893
Number of Districts 474 461 529 529 529 529 529
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time fixed effects and district fixed effects. “First Stage” is an F statistic for weak identification, reporting the
minimum of either the Cragg-Donald or Kleibergen-Paap test statistic. Columns (5) - (7) use the one year lagged values of rainfall. Robust standard errors
clustered at the district level are given in the parentheses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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A Online Appendix
A.1 Conflict Data
Empirical research on the economics of conflict almost always suffer from severe
data limitations. This lies in the nature of the subject of study, that typically places
that exhibit conflict are only weakly institutionalised with little official report of
violence and little press and media coverage. Blattman and Miguel (2009)’s review
cites that the correlation across different civil war datasets ranges from 0.42 to 0.96,
which may be the reason why empirical results are often not reproducible using
similar identification strategies, but different datasets or variable definitions (e.g.
Ciccone (2011)).
There exists no broad conflict dataset that covers India or South East Asia as
a whole. This gap was filled through the violence dataset introduced in Fetzer
(2013). This paper documents the process through which in the Indian context
28,638 newspaper reports were transformed into a workable conflict dataset us-
ing both machine-learning, semi-automated coding techniques and scalable man-
ual hand-coding methods.28 This section sketches the semi-automated process
through which the daily newspaper clippings are transformed (more details are
provided in Fetzer (2013)). A typical sample may look as follows:
Two unidentified terrorists massacred six members of a family and left
a seventh injured at Mangnar Top, Poonch district, on December 31,
2001. Local residents refused to cremate the bodies of the slain victims,
insisting that a Union Minister should visit the area and take notice of
the increasing terrorist violence there.
The semi-automated routine defines a terrorist-incident as an Event-tuple, E =
{L, T, V, S, O} defined by a location L, a date or time of the event T, a verb V
that indicates the type of violent act, and the verb’s associated subject S, the
perpetrator of the act and the object O that was subjected to the act V. The semi-
automated routine tries to fill all these elements of the tuple for each sentence
using common machine-learning algorithms implemented in natural language
processing packages.
In the above text-snippet, only one sentence satisfies the requirement of all
28The raw material was a set of 28,638 newspaper clippings collected by the Institute for Conflict
Management in New Delhi through the South Asian Panel on Terrorism (SATP) since 2001, see http:
//www.satp.org, accessed in October 2012.
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elements being present, yielding:
Two unidentified terrorists︸ ︷︷ ︸
subject
verb︷ ︸︸ ︷
massacred
object︷ ︸︸ ︷
six members of a family
and
verb︷︸︸︷
left
object︷ ︸︸ ︷
a seventh
verb︷ ︸︸ ︷
injured
time & location︷ ︸︸ ︷
at Mangnar Top, Poonch district, on December 31, 2001.
which is transformed into:
E1 = {′Mangar Top Poonch′,′December 31 2001′,
′massacre′,′ two unidentified terrorists′,
′six members of a family at Mangnar Top, Poonch district′}
An incident is counted as long as all pieces of information can be deduced
from the underlying sentence. This is essentially mimicking the process through
which humans would code this data manually. An exhaustive list of verbs is used
to spot events and a sentence is normalised to contain at most one event. The
individual elements of the tuple E are then transformed by assigning labels to the
snippets indicating whether the actor was a terrorist, security force or a civilian
and similarly for who subjected to the act V.29
The data has been evaluated in Fetzer (2013) and correlates very well with
hand-coded data. The correlation between this automatically retrieved data and
the hand-coded data for the Naxalite conflict used by Vanden Eynde (2011) is at
least 93%.
A.2 Comparison of Results with Global Terrorism Database
This section highlights that the results obtained in my paper can not be replicated
when studying the conflict for India contained in the Global Terrorism Database
(GTD) collected by National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses
to Terrorism at the University of Maryland. This database has been used in more
than 30 journal publications and thus, serves as an interesting testing ground.
29Note that in the sentence there exists a further event E2 =
{′Mangar Top Poonch′,′December 31 2001′,′ left′,′
two unidentified terrorists′,′ a seventh injured at Mangnar Top, Poonch district′}. As described in
Fetzer (2013), a sentence will be counted as containing information of at most one incident.
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To begin with, I estimate the main specifications using the number of terrorist
incidences in the global terrorism database as a left-hand side.
Table A6: NREGA Effect in the GTD and Fetzer (2013) dataset
Fetzer (2013) Dataset Global Terrorism Database
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre NREGA Dynamic Level Pre NREGA Dynamic Levels
Monsoon -0.866*** -1.330*** -0.680*** -0.985 -1.338* -1.062**
(0.270) (0.306) (0.261) (0.684) (0.764) (0.462)
NREGA x Monsoon 1.098*** 0.359
(0.388) (0.676)
NREGA -0.540*** -1.098
(0.166) (1.264)
Observations 2841 8868 10199 851 5268 5268
Number of Districts 148 217 217 57 186 186
Notes: All regressions are estimated using a pseduo-maximum likelihood estimator, whose moment
conditions coincide with a Poisson model. Regressions in columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5) include region-
phase-time fixed effects as well as district fixed effects, while results for columns (3) and (6) come from a
regression with time- and district fixed effects. The dependent variable is the number of incidences per
district and quarter. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are given in the parentheses
with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Columns (1)-(3) study the dataset used in this paper, while columns (4)-(6)
use the GTD database. In column (4) it becomes obvious that in the GTD data,
there appears to be no statistically significant correlation between rainfall and
conflict, while there is a strong documented in the Fetzer (2013) data in column
(1). The geographic coverage of the GTD dataset is also a lot more limited before
the introduction of NREGA, with only 57 districts reported as having violent
incidences before NREGA was introduced while there are almost three times as
many districts reported in the other datasets. The moderating effect of NREGA is
seen only in column (2), but not in column (5), albeit the coefficient is positive.
This is a source of concern unless the data coverage in the two datasets varies
systematically in a way that is correlated with rainfall variation. A simple way
to answer this question is to evaluate the two datasets by regressing one on the
other and seeing what are the chances of an incident reported in one dataset to be
represented in the other dataset and how this relationship varied over time, with
rainfall variation and with the interaction of NREGA.
First, I explore the simple relationship over time by estimating:
GTDdt = δd + brt +
2010
∑
t=2000
γt Adt + edt
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I plot the coefficients γt in Figure A1.
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Figure A1: Relationship between Fetzer (2013) and GTD Data over Time
The specification, by using district- and region x time fixed effects takes out
any fixed- conflict region and time varying reporting differences, while the district
fixed effects remove any time-invariant district specific reporting biases. The co-
efficients paint a very stark picture: the datasets do not compare well at all before
2007. The good news is that the coefficients are consistently positive, suggesting
that the overall correlation is positive. However, the point estimates are very small
and only sometimes statistically significantly different from zero. This suggests
that int he earlier years it is extremely unlikely for an incident captured in one
dataset to appear in the other. In more recent years, the data become increasingly
similar.
Why have the two datasets converged? It appears that the underlying data
source in the GTD database has evolved significantly over time. Since 2008, the
SATP reports feed into the GTD database, while before that the GTD database was
mainly fed by newswire services. By 2010, more than 53% of the incidences in the
GTD database were directly referenced with a report from the SATP newspaper
clippings dataset. This is clearly, a lower bound since for many reports in the GTD
dataset one can manually find references in the SATP dataset, but not necessarily
vice versa.
While the level of violence reported in the GTD database seems to be signif-
icantly lower for early years, it is important for the identification whether this
mismatch in reporting is correlated with rainfall realisations.
In order to explore this, I measure the differences and the absolute value of the
differences between the two datasets and run the three specifications from above
again.
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The results are presented in table A7. The coefficients suggest that a positive
rainfall realisation in the preceding month is significantly correlated with a lower
reporting difference, i.e. implying that the mismatch between the Fetzer (2013)
dataset and the GTD dataset is smaller. This highlights that reporting is likely
to be endogenous to past weather and thus, past income realisations. While this
is something that can fundamentally, not be checked, I believe that this is more
likely to be a problem for the GTD database, where reporting has been found
to correlate with Foreign Direct Investment in Fetzer (2013). The introduction of
NREGA appears to have further reduced the mismatch between the two datasets.
Table A7: Evolution of Reporting Differences between GTD and Fetzer (2013) datasets
Reporting Difference Absolute Value of Reporting Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre NREGA Dynamic Level Pre NREGA Dynamic Levels
Monsoon -0.078** -0.090** -0.107*** -0.136***
(0.032) (0.036) (0.030) (0.034)
NREGA x Monsoon 0.051 0.060
(0.042) (0.043)
NREGA -0.398 -0.048 -0.503* -0.094*
(0.269) (0.055) (0.278) (0.050)
Observations 12657 25521 27693 12657 25521 27693
Number of Districts 543 543 543 543 543 543
Notes: All regressions are simple linear regressions with time- and district fixed effects. Robust standard
errors clustered at the district level are given in the parentheses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
If we take this and the previous results together, this suggests that there is
some systematic differences to the GTD dataset which correlates with rainfall in
a systematic way and the introduction of NREGA may have lead to a moderation
of this reporting difference. Since the two datasets appear to be converging over
time and the coverage of the GTD dataset actually expanding, it seems reasonable
to conclude that the SATP data source on which the Fetzer (2013) dataset is a more
consistent way to measure conflict.
A.3 TRMM Rainfall Data
This paper is the first one in economics to use data from the Tropical Rainfall
Measuring Mission (TRMM) satellite, which is jointly operated by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Japan Aerospace and Ex-
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ploration Agency (JAXA). The satellite carries a set of five instruments to construct
gridded rainfall rates at very high spatial and temporal resolution.
Remotely sensed weather data is an important source of data, in particular, for
less developed countries, where observational data is scarce. This is particularly
relevant in the case of India, where observational weather may vary dramatically
in systematic ways. There are three main drawbacks. First, most observations
come from rain gauges, where measurements are taken once a day. Climatologist
are concerned about rain gauges in particular in tropical- or subtropical areas,
since most rainfall is convective. Such convective rainfalls are highly local, gener-
ating intermittent and scattered rainfall, which may not be picked up using rain
gauges, if the network is not spatially fine enough. The TRMM satellite orbits
the earth every 90 minutes, thus providing multiple observations each day. An
alternative is to consider data from weather radars. Rainfall radar may provide
estimates for rainfall in a radius of 200 km around the station, however it is unre-
liable for distances in excess of 200 km. In the Indian case, rainfall radar data is
not made available and would be problematic, since most reporting radar stations
are clustered along the coast. The third general concern regarding observational
weather data is the fact that reporting may be endogenous e.g. to violence or other
variables that are correlated with the dynamics of violence. This has been found
to be the case in hilly regions. This has been highlighted recently by Smith et al.
(2011), who show that Somalian piracy has generated a ”black hole” in the Indian
ocean, where observational weather data from merchant vessels is not available
anymore, as vessels take routes avoiding piracy infested areas.30
The TRMM Multi-Satellite Precipitation Analysis provides daily rainfall from
1998 to 2012 at a fine spatial resolution of 0.25 by 0.25 degree grid-cell size. The
data from the various instruments aboard the satellite are cleaned and calibrated
using additional data from the accumulated Climate Assessment and Monitoring
System (CAMS) and the Global Precipitation Climatology Centre (GPCC) rain
gauge analysis data. The output of the algorithm are 3-hourly rainfall rates for
that time-period. This is then scaled up to obtain monthly mean precipitation
rates, which in turn are transformed into overall monthly rainfall.
Any data product derived from remote sensing suffer from a problem known
as “error propagation” (see Leung et al. (2005)). As the raw data is transformed in
the analytical process, simple small measurement errors may be propagated due
30See Besley et al. (2012) for a discussion. Another example is the case of Vanden Eynde (2011),
who had to merge several districts together in order to obtain consistent rainfall estimates, since many
stations simply fail to report rainfall estimates. Most of these stations are located in places with conflict
or in newly created districts or states.
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to the mathematical and numerical transformations. As remote sensing products
are using some machine-learning algorithms to classify observations, the error
propagation is specific to the algorithm used for classification (see Burnicki et al.
(2007)). In order to take this problem into account, I obtain the PERSIANN pre-
cipitation dataset that is based on the TRMM Multi-Satellite Data as well. This
dataset is used to confirm the main results of this paper and can address the po-
tential issues regarding error-propagation since the type of error propagation is
specific to which algorithm is used.31
A.4 Temperature Reanalysis Data
As a solution to the problem of limited data availability for ground measure-
ments, I construct temperature readings from a gridded daily reanalysis dataset
that uses remote sensing data and sophisticated climate models to construct daily
temperature on a 0.75◦ (latitude) x 0.75◦ (longitude) grid (equivalent to 83km x
83km at the equator).32 The ERA-Interim reanalysis is provided by the European
Centre for Medium-Term Weather Forecasting (ECMWF).33 As the grid is signif-
icantly coarser than the rainfall data, I construct inverse distance weighted daily
mean temperatures for all grid points within 100 km of the geographic centre of
each district. The weighting used is the inverse of the distance squared from the
district centroid.
A.5 Agricultural Production and State Level Harvest Prices
For every district, I only consider crops that have been consistently planted on at
least 1000 acres for the period that the state reports agricultural production to the
data dissemination service of the Directorate of Economics and Statistics with the
Ministry of Agriculture.34 This leaves the following crops: bajra, barley, castor-
seed, chilly, cotton, gram, groundnut, jowar, jute, linseed, maize, mesta, potato,
ragi, rapeseed, rice, sesamum, sugarcane, tobacco, tumeric, tur-arhar and wheat.
For each of these crops, I obtained state-level farm harvest prices to compute a
district level measure of the agricultural GDP. Unfortunately, district level harvest
prices were not available throughout or only for a limited number of crops that
31The TRMM data is from the algorithm 3B-43 (version 7), while the latest PERSIANN precipitation
data was obtained from http://chrs.web.uci.edu/persiann/ on 22.04.2013.
32To convert degrees to km, multiply 83 by the cosine of the latitude, e.g at 40 degrees latitude 0.75
x 0.75 cells are 83 x cos(40) = 63.5 km x 63.5 km.
33See Dee et al. 2011 for a detailed discussion of the ERA-Interim data.
34This data is available on http://apy.dacnet.nic.in/cps.aspx, accessed 14.12.2013.
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did not match well with the actual planted crops. For that reason, I stuck with the
state-level prices. The resulting dataset is an unbalanced panel, since not all states
consistently report data to the Ministry of Agriculture information systems.
Linear Relationship between Agricultural Output and Monsoon Rain
Many papers on the relationship between agricultural incomes and violence use
different transformations on the rainfall variable. A common form that these take
is to considering only rainfall below or above a certain threshold as constituting a
negative productivity shock. In the case of India, the relationship between rainfall
and output is however fairly monotone. To highlight this, I estimated the pro-
duction function using local-linear regression method developed by Fan (1992). I
first demean the data by the region-time fixed effects as well as the district-fixed
effects and then, estimate the following local linear model:
min
η
n
∑
i=1
(y˜i − (R− R˜i)′θ)2K( R˜− R˜ihn )
where y˜i and R˜i are the residuals after removing district- and time fixed ef-
fects. The rainfall variable R˜ is evaluated at 50 grid points around which a linear
regression is estimated. This provides a sequence of estimates of θ that can be
plotted. The results are depicted in Figure A2.
It becomes clear that the gradient suggests a monotonically increasing relation-
ship between agricultural income and rainfall. The standard errors are estimated
using a cluster-bootstrap procedure and the results indicate that one can not rule
out that abundant rainfall is correlated with lower agricultural production as well.
However, it is unlikely that the existing rainfall data is able to pick up local flash
floods sufficiently well, as the spatial resolution is simply too coarse.
A.6 Agricultural Wages in India
This appendix describes the process of how the agricultural wage data was cleaned
and put in shape for the analysis in the paper. The data is of variable and some-
times questionable quality.
The raw data gives monthly wages for male, female and children, broken into
skilled- and unskilled agricultural labour and different types of labour. The types
of skilled labour are blacksmith, carpenter and cobbler, while unskilled labour
combines ploughman, reaper/harvester, sower, weeder, other agricultural labour.
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Figure A2: Local Linear Regression Relationship between Monsoon Rainfall and Agri-
cultural GDP
In some states, these separate unskilled labour categories are not reported35, but
rather, a category “Field Labour Wages” is reported. This is conceived to be an
average of the different categories.
In some districts these wages are reported throughout the year, while in others
the wages are reported only in the parts of the year, when particular activities are
actually carried out (i.e. sowing wages in the early Kharif season of May, June
and July), while harvesting wages are reported in the fall of a given year.
After digitising and entering the raw data, I proceed to construct a quarterly
level agricultural field-labour wage as my main dependent variable.
For each district, there may be multiple wage-observations in case there are
multiple reporting centres. I generate a balanced panel requiring each quarter
of the year to have at least one non-missing observation of agricultural wages
belonging to the particular category of unskilled labour. I then construct the
simple average across these wage-observations.
There are advantages and disadvantages to this approach. In particular, by
construction, this implies that within a year, some field labour wage observations
are noisier then others. This can be taken into account by adequately weighting
the observations.
As an alternative, I can impose the requirement that there be at least one
observation for each different unskilled labour category within a quarter. This
condition is very stringent, as it fails to recognise the types of agricultural activi-
35The states for which this is the case are Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Maharashtra.
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ties that are pursued during a year. This approach reduces the number of districts
significantly, but the results remain the same.
The southwest monsoon typically enters the mainland over Kerala in the first
week of June. It moves northward to cover the whole of India by mid-July. It starts
withdrawing from mid-September. The southwest monsoon is critical to the de-
velopment of Indian agricultural production. The southwest monsoon provides 80
percent of India’s total precipitation and is critical to the development of its major
food and commercial crops such as rice, coarse grains, pulses, peanuts, soybeans
and cotton. Planting of the largely rainfed Kharif (monsoon season) crops, which
include rice, sorghum, corn, millet, peanut, soybean and cotton will begin after
the monsoon firmly establishes itself over the major producing states and plant-
ing will continue through July and early August. Farmers in the northern rice
surplus states of Punjab and Haryana, where irrigation is available, often com-
plete rice transplanting prior to the monsoon arrival. This season’s pre-monsoon,
or early season rains in central, south and east India should provide a favorable
early season planting conditions for rice, soybeans, sorghum and corn. The coun-
try’s economy is to a large extent dependent on monsoon rains.
A.7 NREGA Data Sources and Roll Out
The data for the roll-out of NREGA come from the Ministry of Rural Develop-
ment, which is responsible for administering the scheme. The sequence of roll-out
was highly endogenous to a set of district level backwardness characteristics, such
as the share of scheduled caste, scheduled tribe population, baseline agricultural
productivity, literacy and existing levels of conflict. This becomes obvious when
considering Figure A3. This picture highlights that a lot of districts in the east of
India received NREGA in the first round. A lot of these districts did suffer from
Naxalite violence. As discussed in the main body, I do not require exogeneity of
treatment to levels of violence for my empirical design.
There are two main sources for data on NREGA take-up. These are the district-
level monthly-progress reports (MPR) and data coming from the Management
Information System (MIS). The latter is a completely non-paper based system that
has only become mandatory to use in the financial year but was still not fully
operational until 2010-2011.
There are a lot of issues regarding the reliability of either datasets, as there is
quite some mismatch between the two datasets, especially in the earlier years
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Figure A3: Phases of the NREGA Roll-out across India
when the MIS was introduced.36 This may be due to partial compliance in the
MIS after it had been introduced, but could be also because the MPR system is
more subject to manipulation. It is difficult to asses the underlying divergence in
the two databases.
The MPR data is available continually from 2006 to the financial year 2010-
2011, from which point onwards I rely on data from the MIS.37 The format of the
reports has changed considerably, with the major break occurring in 2011. This
is partly due to the evolving nature of NREGA. Ministry of Rural Development
(2009) details that several programs by the Ministry of Water Resources are to be
joined with the NREGA by 2011. An important part of this program are rural
sanitation projects that are funded by the Ministry of Water Resources for a set
of targeted districts. This implies that there are district-specific breaks in the
NREGA data. In the empirical specifications which combine data from before
and after 2011, I flexibly control for these breaks by introducing a district specific
fixed effect.
36See for example mismatch between MIS data and National Sample Survey returns data highlighted
by http://www.indiatogether.org/2013/jun/gov-nregs.htm,accessed on 12.06.2013.
37Thanks to Clement Imbert for sharing NREGA MPR data for the earliest years.
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I focus on five key variables: for the take-up I study cumulative person days
provided, cumulative number of (distinct) households provided employment as
well as the number of days per household at the district level. I also look at the
number of person days for scheduled caste and scheduled tribe populations, as
well as the share of person days that accrue to females.
For the NREGA project measures, I study the total cost or number of ongo-
ing projects at the end of each financial year. I consider all projects together or
specifically, only projects that are catered towards irrigation.38
Despite having access to NREGA for many months in a financial year, I only
study the reported metrics at the end of each financial year (that is March of each
calendar year). This becomes necessary as there are significant reporting delays
which induce large jumps in the cumulative month on month measures which are
less likely driven by participation, but more likely due to reporting issues.
I construct the NREGA take-up, participation and project data to match the
Monsoon calendar as in the main exercises. Since the financial year commences
each April, the contemporaneous Monsoon variable is more likely to be signifi-
cant, as it may drive take-up during from September onwards.
38The categories in the data that are consistently reported are: ”Micro Irrigation Works”,”Drought
Proofing”,”Water Conservation and Water Harvesting”,”Provision of Irrigation facility to Land Owned
by Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe”.
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